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Tunisienne.  Fax : (216) 71 87 29 97.  Email:  samibibi@gnet.tnAbstract : This paper describes the effects of general food subsidies on
poverty in Tunisia, as revealed by household survey data for 1990.  The
analysis indicates that the poorest certainly take advantage of this system,
but at the price of considerable leakages to non-poor people and at a
sizeable economic efficiency loss resulting from relative price distortions.
Further, non-parametric estimations suggest that there are no commodities
predominantly consumed by the poor.  This implies that targeting by
commodities is not an effective way to fight against poverty and so, it is
unlikely that restructuring the current scheme would improve significantly
the living standards of the less well-off members of society.   We then
investigate the impact on poverty of a more targeted transfer scheme,
based on proxy means-tests, using an appropriate econometric technique
to model it.  Simulations show that this design would be more effective in
reducing poverty than the use of general food subsidies.  Finally,
dominance tests show that this design would first-order-dominate food
subsidies scheme within a range of poverty lines including all those
estimated and generally used for Tunisia.
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1. Introduction
  The living standards of the less well-off members of a society affect public policy and
are also of ethical interest.  Because governments have limited resources, and it is important
to use them efficiently, the question of how to design policies to lessen poverty is likely one
of the most important concerns of policymakers.  Among available tools to enhance the lot of
the poor, targeting by commodities, that is, by subsidizing food staples mainly consumed by
the poorest, has been very popular in developing countries.  Yet targeting by commodities
fails to promote efficiency, by creating economic distortions.  Further, the leakage of food
subsidies to the non-poor people is generally considerable while failure to improve substantially
the well-being of the poorest is well known.
The objective of this work is then twofold.   First, we aim to analyze the effects of one
of the most important tools for alleviating poverty in Tunisia, that is the food subsidies
program.    This analysis requires that we have econometric estimates of the relevant demand
system.  Given this information, it is possible to assess the impact on poverty of this scheme;
using a wide range of poverty lines and poverty measures for robustness analysis.  It will be
also instructive to test whether reforming this system to increase the poorest share of food
subsidies benefits is feasible.  If the presence of some commodities that are largely consumed
by the poorest is proved, increasing food subsidies to these commodities should be an
effective way to lessen poverty.  Otherwise, designing an alternative means to achieve this
goal becomes appealing.
  Unfortunately, estimation results suggest that there are no commodities predominantly
consumed by the poor.  Hence, the second part of this work illustrates how proxy means tests,
using an appropriate econometric technique to model them, could be used to reach a better
outcome on poverty, revenue-neutral.
1  Household characteristics are used as explanatory
variables to compute the income transfer to be awarded to each household; as deduced from a
model designed to minimize the severity of poverty given an anti-poverty budget.
The approach developed in this paper has been applied using a Tunisian data set.
Expending the same anti-poverty budget currently devoted to food subsidies, simulations reveal
large potentialities in alleviating poverty, if targeting by commodities is replaced by the transfer
scheme resulting from our proxy means-tests methodology.  For instance, using robustness
analysis to avoid critical choices of poverty lines and/or poverty measures, the results show that
                                                          
1 With revenue-neutral reforms, the problem of the optimal size of the government is ignored.  An alternative
assumption requires information on the households’ willingness to pay for public goods.  See King (1983).3
the simulated design would dominate targeting by commodities scheme within a wide range of
poverty lines, which includes all those estimated and generally used for Tunisia.
  This paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 provides a broad characterization of the
food subsidies effects on poverty, as well as an evaluation of the leakages and deadweight
loss resulting from this scheme.  Section 3 illustrates how targeting by indicators, when it is
derived from an adequate framework, can be used to achieve a better outcome on poverty.
Section 4 offers some concluding observations.
2. Targeting by commodities: effects on the welfare of the poor population
Searching for a poverty-alleviating reform presupposes agreement on a measure of the
standard of living.  This is an important and controversial subject and would require a separate
study on its own.  In line with most studies, we use the total expenditure per capita as a basis
for measuring the (permanent) income.
2
We assume that before implementing the food subsidies scheme, each household h has
an exogenous income y
h and faces the price system p
o.  After implementing the targeting by
commodities program, by expanding the compensation fund B available to finance this policy,
each household has the same nominal income, y
h, but faces a new price system p
p.  We aim to
compare the levels of a household's welfare when it faces different price systems.  To achieve
this goal, we choose a benchmark price system, denoted by p
r, and we define as in King
(1983) the concept of equivalent income: for a given budget constraint (p, y), equivalent
income is defined as that income level which allows, at the benchmark price system, the same
utility level as can be reached under the given budget constraint.  Formally, we have:
), , ( ) , ( y v y v e
r p p =      (1)
where v(.) is the indirect utility function, p is a vector of price system, and y is a vector of a
household’s income per capita.  Notice that since p
r is fixed across all households, ye is an
exact monetary metric of actual utility v(p,  y) because ye is an increasing monotonic
transformation of v(.).  Thus, inverting the indirect utility function, we obtain the equivalent
income in terms of the expenditure function:
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2 Obviously, this is not the best option, although there are good reasons to use this indicator in practice.  Deaton
(1997) provides an exhaustive discussion about this subject.4
where e(.) is the expenditure function, that is the minimal amount of income necessary to
reach utility v at prices p, and ye(.) is the equivalent income function.
3
 If  p
r is set to be equal to the non food subsidies price system, that is p
r = p
o, the move
from the original situation to the current one, when some food items are subsidized, could be
considered as a first means to fight against poverty by enhancing the purchasing power of
households.  The maximum gain per capita for each household, Μ
h, resulting from this policy
could be computed using the next formula:
, ) (
h o p h x p p − = Μ  (3)
where x
h is the consumption basket per capita of household h purchased following this policy.
Because it does not require any hypothesis on the consumption behavior of households, Μ
h is
easy to compute.  Yet considering the deadweight loss (DL) resulting from distortionary
subsidies, this measure overestimates the welfare improvement.  A satisfactory measure of the
households’ value of this program is the change in their equivalent income.  This measure is
known as the equivalent gain per capita, Ε
h, and it is given by:
.
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  The DL resulting from distortionary subsidies let the equivalent gain always less
important than the maximum gain.  Hence, a natural definition of the excess burden arising
from this distortionary transfer is:
, DL Ε − Μ =    (5)
where Ε Μ and are respectively the average of the maximum and equivalent gain.
  Along with information about the distribution of welfare gains among households, it is
worthy to assess the social impact of the scheme under consideration.  Since the main
objective of the current program is to improve the welfare of the poor, a natural measure of its
social impact could be given by the decline of a pre-specified poverty index.  Many poverty
measures can be expressed in terms of poverty gaps g for income y and poverty line z as:
{} . 0 , max
h h y z g − =
  Following Jenkins and Lambert (1997), poverty measures which are defined in terms
of g and which are in line with the aforementioned axioms belong to the class of Generalized
                                                          
3 It is obvious that ye(p
r, p
r, y) = y.5
Poverty Gap (GPG) indices.  An important subset of GPG is the FGT set of additively
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where H is the total number of households in the survey, n
h is the size of household h, n is the
average size of households, and α  may be deemed as a measure of poverty aversion: a larger
α  gives greater emphasis to the poorest of the poor.  When α  becomes very large, Ρ α (.)
approaches a Rawlsian measure, which considers only the poorest households’ welfare.  The
FGT class involves many commonly used poverty measures as special cases.  For instance,
when  α  = 0, Ρ 0(.) is the headcount ratio which is insensitive to variations of the poor’s
income; while for α  = 1, Ρ 1(.) is the (non-normalized) poverty deficit.
5   Finally, for α  > 1,
Ρ α (.) is sensitive to inequality within the poor.
  Considering we wish to assess the effects of the food subsidy program, poverty
measures should be sensitive to price system variations.  For this purpose, we present them in
terms of values of the equivalent income function.  Hence, the social impact of this anti-
poverty program could be captured using the next formula:
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where ze is the equivalent poverty line, that is the minimum expenditure level required at p
o to
reach the indifference curve corresponding to the minimum standard of living one.
  Furthermore, since the poverty measures are estimated on the basis of sample
observations, we need to test whether the predicted magnitude and direction of change in
poverty following this anti-poverty scheme is statistically significant, which is possible using
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where σ (.) is the standard error of ∆Ρ α :
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4 In reality, this is a non-normalized version of the FGT poverty measures class, adopted also by Chakravarty
and Mukherjee (1998).  The normalized version is given by ϕ , where: ϕ
h = max{1 – y
h/z, 0}.
5 This is a good measure only if all the poor have the same living standards.  See the Axiom N of Sen (1976).






  The methodology presented above is applied to data set from the 1990 Tunisian
survey.  This is a multipurpose household survey which provides information on expenditures
and quantities for food items and expenditures for non-food items, as well as on many other
dimensions of 7734 households behavior; education, housing, region of residence,
demographic information, and economic activities.  The application of this methodology
requires to compute foremost the equivalent income function, ye(.), the construction of which
calls for the estimation of an appropriate demand system.
7
Arguably, a general equilibrium model is required to elicit the sharing out of food
subsidy benefits between firms and households.  Most computable general equilibrium
models broadly assume that all production functions are homogeneous of degree one and that
there is perfect competition.  Under these assumptions, the supply curve of each commodity is
horizontal so that consumers reaped the entire benefits of the indirect transfers.  For
simplicity, we assume such framework, although there is nothing in the followed approach
that prevents the introduction of alternative hypotheses.   Hence, through this scheme,
consumer price is lowered below marginal cost by 37 percent for hard wheat, 35 percent for
tender wheat, 9 percent for other wheat, 14 percent for poultry and eggs, 18 percent for milk,
24 percent for sugar, and 34 percent for grain oil.  The outcomes of this program, for different
poverty lines and poverty measures, are summarized in the following table.
8
                                                          
7 Bibi (1998) has estimated the parameters of IQAIDS demand system according Deaton’s (1988) methodology,
who assumes spatial price variation in the survey and makes use of unit values as indicators of market prices.
We use the estimation results of this demand system to compute the equivalent income.
8 The identification problem is beyond the aim of this study.  So we use a wide range of poverty lines to avoid an
arbitrary choice.  Note that the official poverty line estimated (under the vector p
p) by the National Statistic
Institute (see the World Bank (1995)) is between 196 and 252 DT. Ayadi and Matoussi (1999) found that z is
rather between 213 and 262 DT.7
Table 1: Impact of targeting by commodities program on poverty
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  The presence of targeting by commodities scheme is a meaningful source of welfare
improvement for the poor, as the decline of all poverty measures proved.  In addition, table 1
shows that the subsidies on foodstuffs benefited more the poorest of the poor than the richest
in relative terms, that is targeting by commodities program is progressive in relative terms.
For instance, we note that poverty reduction is less important as the equivalent poverty line
rise for a given poverty index.  This result would be strengthened if it could be shown that the
contribution of equivalent gain to total expenditure, (Ε
h/y
h), declined monotonically with
increases in income.   In figure 1, we display the results of the link between these two
variables obtained using a non-parametric estimation, with Gaussian kernel and bandwidth
selected to minimize the mean integrated square error.
10  The results are revealing, since they
confirm the progressive feature of the current program. Also, as the slope of figure 1 is always
                                                          
9 For convenience, we report [Ρ α (.)]
(1/α ) instead of Ρ α (.) for α  ≥  1. So, if α  = 2, we have a quadratic average of
poverty deficit.  Another attraction of this increasing monotonic transformation is that, since the inequality
among the poor let [Ρ α (.)]
(1/α ) > Ρ 1(.), the difference between [Ρ α (.)]
(1/α ) and Ρ 1(.) could be interpreted as an
overall cost of inequality.
10 See Silverman (1986).8
negative, regardless of the (equivalent) poverty line chosen, we can argue that the post-
subsidy distribution of expenditures dominate the (hypothetical) pre-subsidy one within all the
range of income variations.
11
Performances of targeting by commodities in reducing poverty do not indicate, however,
that it is an optimal transfer design.  Indeed, the magnitude of the income transfer to the non-
poor, that is the leakages of the program benefits, is very important.  The distribution of the
absolute benefits between the different quintile groups, arranged in ascending order from the
poorest quintile to the richest, is reported in the following table.
Table 2: Distribution of equivalent and maximum gain from food subsidies program
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11 In the stochastic dominance literature, this result is known as “first-order dominance.”
12 Values between parentheses indicate the cumulative distribution of the variable under consideration.








0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000

























  Table 2 shows that the anti-poverty program in hand benefited the rich more than the
poor in absolute terms.  The richest quintile group of the population received 2.2 times more of
the equivalent gains from food subsidies than the poorest, with an average equivalent gain per
capita  ) ( s Ε of 41.25 DT and 18.75 DT respectively.
13  This mistaken awarding of transfers to the
non-targeted group reduces the vertical efficiency of this scheme and leads to the leakage of
program benefits.  It is obtained by adding the transfers that are given to those who are ineligible
in perfect targeting and the total cost of the deadweight loss.  Indeed, the excess burden cost
represents another source of leakage, which is specific to the distortionary transfers, and should
also be added to the traditional leakage cost.  The leakage ratio, which is obtained by dividing the
leakages by the available budget, approximates at least 75 percent of the anti-poverty funds even
if we should admit that 40 percent of the population is poor.
14  Further, 16.7 points of percentage
of the leakage ratio are related to the excess burden cost.   In the absence of this distortionary
cost, the equivalent gains would equalize the maximum gain and the impact on poverty would be
more important.
15  Regarding the weight of the deadweight loss and, especially, the weak
benefits targeted to the poorest group, the restructuring of this scheme must be a pressing
priority.  Thus, it is worthy to investigate first, reform possibilities within the existing framework
of targeting by commodities over those requiring a new institutional structure to avoid the
transition costs of such a moving.
16
  The previous analysis raises the question of how to improve targeting by commodities so
as to reduce as much as possible the leakage of its benefits to the non-poor.  For this purpose, we
need an estimate of the expected expenditure on each commodity conditional upon individuals’
income, which could be obtained consistently by non-parametric regressions.  If the estimation
results reveal the presence of some commodities predominantly consumed by the poorest,
increasing food subsidy to these commodities should be an effective way to raise the poorest
share of food subsidies benefits; and so to lessen more poverty.  Estimation results of the
income-expenditure relationship for different commodities (the Engel curves) are displayed
graphically in figure 2.
                                                          
13 In 1990, 1 DT is close to 1 US dollar.
14 Creedy (1996) has distinguished between the vertical expenditure inefficiency, that is equal to the leakage
ratio as defined here, and the poverty reduction efficiency which includes also the total transfers which, although
received by the pre-transfer poor, are in a sense unnecessary since these individuals are raised above the poverty
line.  Because the cost of unnecessary transfers is really insignificant when anti-poverty design is based on
targeting by commodities, we ignore its computation in this section.
15 Simulations show that the opportunity cost of the excess burden in terms of poverty reduction is between 2 and
3 percent according to the poverty line and poverty measure selected.  See table A-3 in annex for more details.
16 These costs are related to the political, economic, and administrative constraints of implementing a more
targeted program excluding powerful groups of the population.  On this issue, see Besley and Kanbur (1993).10
  It is worthwhile to give another interpretation of this figure.  Consider a policymaker
who aims to decrease the incidence of poverty but does not know who is really poor.  To be
on the safe side, it is best to lessen the headcount ratio regardless of the poverty line chosen.
17
This requires the presence of some commodities whose expenditures are downward sloping
across different income groups (at least from a threshold level of income) and even fall down
at higher income groups.  Unfortunately, the main feature of the regressions shown in figure 2
is that there is no commodity fulfilling this requirement.  Restructuring the current scheme, by
reducing subsidies on other subsidized items and raising them on wheat and cooking oil, could
probably decrease to some extent leakages.  Given that the non-poor purchase all commodities,
this is not an effective means to increase targeting accuracy and so, it is unlikely to improve
significantly the living standard of the poorest without looking for an alternative targeting
procedure.
                                                          
17 This is necessary to have a post-reform income distribution which first-order-dominates the pre-reform income
distribution, regardless of the poverty lines and poverty measures chosen.
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3. An alternative means to fight against poverty: proxy means tests
  The previous findings chiefly reveal that leakages from food subsidies to non-poor
people are very large while a failure to improve substantially the living standards of the poorest
is manifest.  Because governments have limited resources, and given that it is important to use
them efficiently, looking for an alternative targeting tool to achieve more poverty reduction is an
appealing goal.  However, it is not usually easy to identify the poor directly.  Whilst such
identification is required to curb poverty given an available budget, it is unlikely to be
administratively feasible cheaply [Besley and Kanbur (1993)]. It is for this reason that among
targeting options, awarding benefits to the poorest based on targeting by indicators could be an
attractive alternative to targeting by commodities.
18
There is plenty of theoretical modeling and empirical estimation concerned with the
question of how to provide assistance to poor people when it is possible to observe some
individuals’ characteristics, but not their income.  For instance, Ravallion and Chao (1989)
have modeled the targeting problem as one of minimizing some particular poverty measures
subject to an anti-poverty budget.  They have constructed an algorithm allowing an optimal
use of limited number of dummy variables by explicitly minimizing a selected poverty index
given an available budget.  The main issue with this method is that it cannot be applied
without losing some information, especially when some available variables are continuous.
  To avoid this limit, Glewwe and Kanaan (1989) as Baker and Grosh (1995) have
followed a two-step procedure leading to a least predicted poverty.  In a first step, the
expectation of households’ income per capita conditional on some indicators was estimated
by ordinary least square (OLS) regression.  In the second step, they have simulated the impact
of awarding a transfer to each household predicted poor.
Whilst poverty measures are not sensitive to welfare variations of the non-poor, the
predictive power of OLS methods is increased when the errors between true and predicted
income at the top of the welfare distribution decrease.  Because a higher predictive power
does not necessarily lead to a better targeting accuracy, the OLS technique is therefore not a
suitable choice.  To overcome drawbacks of the previous approaches, Glewwe (1992) has
developed a framework allowing the use of dummy and continuous variables.  Although his
approach is theoretically as plausible as Ravallion and Chao’s (1989) one, it is much more
                                                          
18 On the advantages and drawbacks of the main imperfect targeting options, see for instance Baker and Grosh
(1995), Bigman and Fofack (2000), Glewwe (1992), and Ravallion (1992).12
difficult to compute, and does not produce results really different from those based on OLS
regression [Baker and Grosh (1995)].
  The approach suggested here attempts to go over the basic difficulties of the previous
ones while preserving their main advantages.  Thus, it is theoretically plausible, easier to
compute, and enables to use a large set of discrete and continuous variables.
 Assume  that  Ρ α (.) is unaffected by the vector of transfers Τ .
19  Assume equally that
each household is a representative one of a given subgroup of the population with Ρ h,α (.) is the
Ρ α (.) measure for the h
th subgroup.  When the objective is to minimize poverty given the anti-
poverty budget B, the optimal awarding of benefits is the one leading to the least poverty, as
defined by a pre-selected FGT measure.  Formally, we have to resolve the program below:
, subject to
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where w
h is the proportion of the population having the same characteristics of household h,
and T
h is the per capita transfer to be awarded to subgroup h in perfect targeting so as to
maximize the fall in poverty.  It is required to be non-negative for all subgroups, since we
have not to consider how the available budget B is financed.
  From Kanbur (1987), we know that if the population is divided into mutually
exclusive subgroups, when the objective is to minimize the α
th order measure Ρ α (.), the
budget should be allocated so as to equalize the (α  - 1)
th order measures Ρ h,α -1(.) in the
different subgroups.  In reality, the available budget could not permit to reach all the
subgroups.  For α  > 1, some richest subgroups of the poor should then be excluded from the
benefits of this program since it is optimal to transfer the entire anti-poverty budget to the
poorest subgroups of the poor.
20  The available budget will be spent so as to decrease as many
of the poorest subgroups measures Ρ h,α -1(.) as possible up to a common
measure (.) 1 , − Ρ α h below their initial one.
 Obviously,  Ρ h,α -1(.) is often costly to observe directly, so that perfect targeting is not
feasible.  Yet these poverty measures are likely to be correlated with observable variables,
denoted by the vector x.  If x contains regional characteristics, it is possible to make use of the
                                                          
19 Besley and Kunbur (1993) provide a discussion about the incentive effects of a transfer scheme targeted to
poor population.
20 Using the terminology of Bourguignon and Fields (1997), this corresponds to a ‘p-type’ transfer scheme.  On
the other hand, for α  < 1, they show that it is optimal to spend the available so as to lift as many of the richest
subgroups of the poor out of poverty as possible.  This corresponds to a ‘r-type’ transfer scheme.13
regional targeting approach to study to what extent their outcomes could be better than those
of targeting by commodities.
21  B u t  i f  x includes other variables that are not continuous,
targeting accuracy of transfers to the poorest could be enhanced, and Ravallion and Chao’s
(1989) algorithm becomes the best means to get an optimal allocation of the available budget.
As discrete and continuous variables are often found in x, this algorithm cannot be used without
losing some information; especially because continuous variables should be beforehand
transformed into discrete ones.
  A suitable technique is available, however, if the problem could be addressed as a
censored model, in which case Tobit regression becomes a relevant tool to avoid many
drawbacks of previous methods:
otherwise. 0 ) , (
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The estimation of Φ (.) is then theoretically very plausible.  The transfer scheme that
would result from the estimation of equation (10), noted  , ˆ Τ  is explicitly computed with
regard to the functional form of the pre-selected poverty measure.  Furthermore, for a large
value of α , estimation of equation (10) takes into account the fact that the corresponding
poverty measures are more sensitive to errors of exclusion among poorer households.  Finally,
the probability that a higher predictive power of Φ (.) leads to a better targeting accuracy is
more important than that of a higher predictive power of the usual OLS estimation.
When it is possible to alleviate poverty greater within the new design, it is then
possible to reach the pre-reform poverty level while reducing public spending. This reduction,
which is equal to the marginal benefit (per capita) of imperfect targeting design, is given by:
22
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  This evaluation is particularly interesting since, in the wake of structural adjustments,
the reduction of public deficit without impairing the welfare of a targeted group is one of the
most sought-after objectives.
  In general, the imperfect-targeting ability to lessen poverty has to increase with the
number of correlated characteristics with the welfare distribution included in x.  Let xj a vector
                                                          
21 On the regional targeting approach, see Kanbur (1987), Bigman and Fofack (2000), and Park et al. (2002).14
of characteristics which contains more information than xi.  We can capture this improved
targeting from additional information by computing the marginal benefit of the new
information, noted MB(xj|xi).  Formally, it can be expressed as follows:
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            (12)
  The knowledge of the marginal benefit of each observable characteristic is very useful
especially because this observation is not costless.  The solution to problem (12) is thus the
best means to assess the maximum cost which the policymakers are willing to support without
reappraisal of imperfect targeting relief.  The optimal set of variables should be fixed so that
the marginal benefit from the last indicator equates its marginal administrative cost.
23  Hence,
the more important is the marginal benefit of some characteristics, the better are the
possibilities to cover the cost of observing them while alleviating poverty.  The strategy
followed by the households attempting to become eligible or to get more transfer, by
providing false information, could end in failure.
24
The methodology presented above can be implemented for different values of poverty
aversion, α .  For instance, if the objective is to minimize Ρ 2(.), the equation (10) must be
estimated using as dependent variable the deficit of poverty, g
h.
25  An equivalent poverty line
of 360 DT per capita per year is used.  Many of the explanatory variables used to estimate the
model should not be costly to identify and should not be manipulated cheaply.  These
variables are reported and defined in table A-1 in annex.  The variables can be clustered in
two sets.  In set I, we find the vector x
I which includes only regional characteristics of the
households.
26 Set II (vector x
II) includes in addition to regional indicators, demographic
information of each household and some characteristics of the household’s dwelling.
Whereas it is technically easy to add other information, like the occupation of the households’
head and his education level, we avoid doing this since some people attempting to become
                                                                                                                                                                                    
22 Cost reduction calculated by Glewwe and Kanaan (1989) as well as by Glewwe (1992) are identical to the
marginal benefit.
23 Rai (2002) shows that targeting costs can be substantially reduced by asking recipients to make reports about
each other.
24 Also, according to Besley (1990), it is not excluded that some non-poor households will avoid masquerading
as poor because of the psychic costs of the social stigma resulting from the participation in programs meant
specifically for the poor.
25 The squared poverty deficit, (g
h)
2, is the dependent variable when the aim is to minimize Ρ 3(.).  Such an
extension is let for a future research.
26 The use of this set enables us to compare performances of model (10) with regard to performances of regional
targeting model in lessening poverty.15
eligible or to get more benefits may effortlessly conceal these variables.  Table A-2 in annex
presents Tobit estimators of the equation (10).
Using estimation results of the equation (10), table 3 gives the effects on the poor
population welfare of the two estimated models (reported in the two last columns) to be
compared with targeting by commodities (reported in second column).
27  Besides, this table
reports (in the third column) the outcomes of regional targeting model when the objective is to
minimize Ρ 2(.).
Table 3: Impact on poverty of alternative schemes
α Ρ α (ze, y + Μ ) Ρ α (ze, y + RT) Ρ α (ze, y + Τ




































* Poverty difference between current and precedent simulation is significant at 1 percent level.
+ Poverty difference between current and precedent simulation is not significant, yet poverty difference between
current simulation and targeting by commodities is significant at 1 percent level.
  For the purpose of comparing this methodology to previous ones, table 3 shows that
the Tobit regression performs as better as the geographic targeting model when we use only
regional variables.  This evidence supports the fact that our procedure could be at least as
useful as the previous ones that are theoretically plausible.
28   Broadly, using only regional
characteristics lowers leakages by 14 points of percentage.  This decline entails a significant
reduction of poverty from the original level - given by the food subsidies scheme - when the
aim is to minimize the severity of poverty, Ρ 2(.).  This decline is between 6 and 15 percent
according to whether the poverty measure retained is Ρ 0(.) or Ρ 2(.).  Furthermore, one way to
look at the gains from targeting is to see by how much money can be saved while attaining the
same poverty alleviation achieved by food subsidies.  So, when the aim is to minimize Ρ 2(.),
regional targeting allows the alleviation of poverty as much as targeting by commodities,
                                                          
27 The DL costs resulting from food subsidies are ignored in the following comparison. Indeed, if the simulated
reforms decrease more poverty under this hypothesis, these results would be at least maintained under an
alternative hypothesis.
28 For instance, when only regional characteristics are included for OLS regression, the outcomes produced by
Baker and Groch’s (1995) procedure are far from being in compliance with those obtained from geographic
targeting  model.  We have also checked that the outcomes produced using our methodology are always better.16
while providing a substantial budgetary saving, equal to 19.10 Tunisian dinars (TD) per
capita.
29
  Performances of regional targeting do not indicate, nevertheless, that it is the optimal
transfer scheme. Adding demographic and dwelling information on households to provide
assistance to the poor, simulation II reveals an additional decline in leakages, which allows
for more poverty alleviation than regional targeting does.  Poverty could be reduced further by
10 percent for α  = 0 up to 18 percent for α  = 2. .  Moreover, considering both demographic
and dwelling characteristics make possible to increase the budgetary saving by 7.88 TD per
capita, bringing it from 19.10 to 26.98 TD per capita, without altering poverty from its
original level.  Yet, if the observation cost of this  last information set exceeds 7.88 TD per
capita (which corresponds to 22.6 percent of the available budget), the imperfect targeting
becomes irrelevant and the regional targeting scheme is likely to be the only alternative to the
current system.
30
The analysis that we have just led is based on the choice of a poverty line z and a
poverty measure Pα (.) whose specification is essentially arbitrary.  The literature on poverty
dominance provides methods for addressing these two problems.  For instance, Atkinson
(1987) has defined criteria of dominance corresponding to levels of stochastic dominance.  He
has also underlined that lower degree dominance usually entails higher degree dominance, but
that the converse does not necessary hold.
Suppose that it is possible to have an agreement neither about the choice of the
poverty line, that is on the position of the poverty line in the resource space, nor on the choice
of the poverty measure.  Then, it can be shown that poverty will certainly fall following the
simulated design based on indicators included in x
II, regardless of the poverty line and the
poverty measure chosen, if we have:
∆Ρ 0(.) = Ρ 0(ze, y + Μ ) - Ρ 0(ze, y + Τ
II) ≥  0,          (13)
 for all ze with at least one strict inequality.  In the dominance literature, this finding is known
as “first-order dominance” (FOD).  Figure 3 illustrates the relationship of universal food
subsidies and direct transfers based on proxy means tests to FOD and the headcount ratio
variation.
                                                          
29 In 1990, one Tunisian dinar is approximately one US dollar.
30 The marginal benefit of these variables per household is 45.41 TD (22.6 percent of the available budget).  So it
is hard to believe that the administrative cost of this program could exceed this amount.  For instance, Baker and
Grosh (1995) report that the cost of the Chile’ s program, based on proxy means tests, is approximately 5 US
dollars per assessment. Also, Kesselman (1982) finds that administrative costs as a percentage of benefits ranged
from 5.2 percent to 15.4 percent for the tested programs in U.K.17
  Hence, by plotting the cumulative difference in percentages of the population below
various equivalent poverty lines, we find that ∆Ρ 0(.) could be negative.  The impact of
providing assistance to the poor based on targeting by indicators with regard to targeting by
commodities is therefore ambiguous.  Some equivalent poverty lines and some poverty
measures will show a better effect on poverty following the p-type transfers’ scheme, but
some others will show a contrasting outcome.  Yet, if it is admitted that the equivalent poverty
line could never exceed 540 DT, then it is possible to argue that targeting by indicators of
transfers is unambiguously more effective in serving the poorest than universal food subsidies
scheme, no matter which FGT poverty measure is chosen.  It is perhaps useful here to note
that this range includes all the poverty lines estimated for Tunisia. 
  Nonetheless, if it is
relevant to set the cut-off poverty beyond the limit of 540 DT, the outcome becomes
equivocal and FOD is unable to rank the relative effectiveness of p-type direct transfer in
alleviating poverty.
Considering that these two schemes cannot be ranked by FOD, it is possible to order
them by second-order dominance (SOD).  A fall in poverty with p-type transfers requires that
the poverty deficit measure for the post-reform distribution is not higher than that for the
status quo everywhere among the range variation of ze, that is:
∆Ρ 1(.) = Ρ 1(ze, y + Μ ) - Ρ 1(ze, y + Τ
































for all ze with at least one strict inequality.  As we are simulating a revenue-neutral reform,
this difference is equal to the cost reduction of awarding the non-targeted group, that is the
decrease of leakages.  Figure 2 illustrates the relationship of universal food subsidies and p-
type transfers to SOD and the cumulative poverty deficit variation.
Figure 4 shows that direct transfers based on targeting by indicators second-order-
dominates indirect transfers based on targeting by commodities, even up to an equivalent
poverty line equalizing 1500 DT.  Since the cumulative benefits with targeting by indicators
are positive at each equivalent poverty line up to 1500 DT, we can argue that the proposed
design is more effective in decreasing the poverty deficit; and this holds for all poverty
measures with α  ≥  1.  The need to test higher orders of dominance becomes really thin since



























  The food subsidies program is one of the most important tools for alleviating poverty in
Tunisia, but its effects are not well understood.   The presence of this scheme makes the poverty
problem less serious than it should appear in official statistics.  This paper is partly concerned by
this subject.  Notwithstanding, even if the food subsidies scheme lessens poverty, looking for
alternative design to improve targeting accuracy of limited resources is always one of the most
important objectives of policymakers.
To achieve these goals, the second section presents a methodology, which enables the
evaluation of the food subsidy effects on the poor population’s welfare.  It consists in
computing the King’s (1983) equivalent income gain for each household, in the available
sample, which results from the current program.  The distribution of these gains could be so
aggregated to capture the poverty reduction achieved under the current scheme.  This analysis
reveals that the food subsidies program is certainly a meaningful source of welfare
improvement for the poor.  Yet it entails an important excess burden and benefits the rich
more than the poor in absolute terms.  For instance, the richest quintile group of the
population receives 2.2 times more of the equivalent gains from food subsidies than the
poorest quintile.  Moreover, non-parametric estimations suggest that there are no commodities
predominantly consumed by the poor.  This limits the targeting-by-commodities option to further
significantly the goal of poverty reduction and so, it becomes appealing to look for an alternative
option, like the targeting-by-indicators one, to reach this objective.
For the purpose of assessing to what extent proxy means tests could raise the poorest
share of the available budget, the third section suggests a new approach to target p-type direct
transfers. Whereas it overcomes some drawbacks of the main previous methods, this approach
is also theoretically plausible.  More precisely, since it is optimal to award the available
budget so as to equalize the (α  - 1)
th order poverty measures of the poorest subgroups, when
the objective is to minimize the α
th order poverty measure, we suggest estimating straightly
the (α  - 1)
th order poverty deficit of each household, conditional upon some of its
characteristics.  The results are encouraging.  For instance, when only easily observed
indicators are included to look for a p-type transfer design, results show that poverty could be20
reduced –  from the original level given by the food subsidies scheme – at least by 15.8
percent for  0 = α  and up to 30.6 percent for α  = 2.
31
In order to avoid diverse and conflicting views on how to select the poverty line and
poverty measure, dominance tests are also used to assess the likely effects of direct transfers
derived from targeting by indicators on a wide range of poverty lines and poverty measures.
The main result is that such transfers design would first-order-dominate the current food
subsidies scheme within a range of poverty lines including more a larger set that all those
estimated for and used in Tunisia.  Thus, it is possible to conclude that providing assistance to
the poor based on targeting by indicators should be more effective in alleviating poverty than
targeting by commodities, regardless of the poverty measure chosen.
The methodology followed in this paper does not include the possibility for
households to change the characteristics by which they could be targeted.  For instance, by
some effort or with some loss of utility, some characteristics could be altered or concealed by
households attempting to receive a (greater) transfer.  While it is feasible that the marginal
benefit of doing so will outweigh the marginal effort required, it is unlikely that the net
benefit of such behavior will always be non-negative.  It is also not excluded that some non-
poor households would avoid masquerading as poor, because of the psychic costs of the social
stigma resulting from the participation in programs meant specifically for the poor [Besley
and Kanbur (1993)].  The empirical analysis of this paper does not consider either the indirect
effects on poverty, which would arise through the impact of the simulated reforms on
conditions in other markets, such as those for labor.  In reality, only applied general
equilibrium models can allow to include all indirect and direct effects of the suggested
reforms.  All these issues raise interesting and useful avenues for further research.
                                                          
31 In reality, poverty would fall even more if we considered the excess burden costs resulting from food subsidies
scheme.21
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6. Annex
























1 if household lives in Great Tunis, 0 otherwise.
1 if household lives in a region of the Northeast, 0 otherwise.
1 if household lives in a region of the Northwest, 0 otherwise.
1 if household lives in a region of the Middle east, 0 otherwise.
1 if household lives in a region of the Middle west, 0 otherwise.
1 if household lives in Sfax, 0 otherwise.
1 if household lives in a region of the Southeast, 0 otherwise.
1 if household lives in a region of the Southwest, 0 otherwise.
Number of children in household old less than 2 years old.
Number of children aged between 3 and 6 years.
Number of children aged between 7 and 11 years.
Number of adults aged between 12 and 18 years.
Number of adults old more than 19 years.
Age of the household head (HH).
Squared age of the HH.
Number of rooms per capita
1 if household lives in a detached house, 0 otherwise.
1 if household lives in a flat, 0 otherwise.
1 if household lives in an Arab house, 0 otherwise.
1 if household lives in a hovel, 0 otherwise.
Variables which are in italic have been omitted during estimations.24
Table A-2: Regression results

















































































Table A-3: The opportunity cost of the deadweight loss in terms of poverty reduction
α ze Ρ α (ze, y + Ε ) Ρ α (ze, y + Μ ) ∆Ρ α  (%) κ
0
0
0
0
0
265
290
320
345
360
0.144
0.176
0.219
0.255
0.278
0.138
0.169
0.211
0.250
0.271
-4.12
-4.12
-3.51
-2.29
-2.59
-2.5
-2.9
-2.8
-2
-2.4
1
1
1
1
1
265
290
320
345
360
9.725
13.688
19.616
25.565
29.556
9.169
13.021
18.720
24.495
28.378
-5.71
-4.87
-4.57
-4.18
-4.02
-2.7
-2.8
-2.8
-2.9
-2.9
2
2
2
2
2
265
290
320
345
360
31.467
39.657
50.596
60.743
67.157
30.446
38.363
49.159
59.155
65.496
-3.24
-3.26
-284
-2.61
-2.47
-2.5
-2.6
-2.7
-2.8
-2.8
 